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Abstract: In the wake of the recent financial crisis heterodox economists have taken up a time-honored 
refrain and proposed to abandon the axiomatic method. The present paper argues that this proposal is self-
defeating. 
 
 
 An economic crisis is always a crisis of economic theory – of mainstream economics, 
to be sure – and the latest financial crisis is no exception. This is the day of reckoning for the 
heterodox camp and, of course, rightly so for quite different reasons. The heterodox 
economists, though, have a crisis of their own design. That there must be something better 
than current mainstream economics, all are agreed (including the neoclassical economists), 
but this consensus is accompanied by a bookshelves-filling disagreement about diagnosis 
and remedy. Regrettably the better theory is not available when the next crisis hits. Let us 
take Keynesianism as a case in point. 
 
 The Keynesian Revolution was intended as both, a radical change of economic policy 
and a groundbreaking paradigm shift (Coddington, 1976). Keynes left no doubt about the 
scientific scope of the General Theory: 
The classical theorists resemble Euclidean geometers in a non-Euclidean world (…). 
Yet, in truth, there is no remedy except to throw over the axiom of parallels and to 
work out a non-Euclidean geometry. Something similar is required to-day in 
economics. (Keynes, 1973 p. 16) 
 
 Keynes’s main concern was not market or policy failure but theory failure. He 
envisioned nothing less than a 'complete theory of a monetary economy' (Keynes, 1973 p. 
293). While clearly aware that this at the same time required a consistent set of some kind of 
non-Euclidean axioms, Keynes had no desire that the particular forms of his 'comparatively 
simple fundamental ideas (…) should be crystallized at the present state of the debate' (cited 
in (Rotheim, 1981 p. 571)). 
 
 There remained a huge gap between Keynes’s verbalized theory and its formal basis. 
His conceptual groundwork consists in the main of the well-known equations Y=C+I and S=Y–
C (Keynes, 1973 p. 63). This formal basis is too small and on no account general. The 
palpable incongruence left too much room for interpretation and precipitated the lengthy 
dispute about 'what Keynes really meant'. Some observers felt that this question was beside 
the point: 
L’intuition de Keynes lui a fait sentir où se trouvaient les difficultés, mais son 
insuffisance logique ne lui a pas permis de résoudre les problèmes que son intuition 
lui avait fait entrevoir. (Allais, 1993 p. 70), see also (Laidler, 1999 p. 281) 
 
 Whatever the reasons, the Keynesian camp failed to rectify the incongruence in a 
satisfactory manner. What we had, then, before the latest financial crisis occurred, was, 
roughly expressed, a perfectly formalized neoclassical theory with no real-world content on 
the one hand and an assortment of plausible down to earth approaches with no sound − not 
to speak of a common − formal basis on the other. 
 
 Referring to the crisis Leijonhufvud summed up: 
 15
real-world economics review, issue no. 56 
 
The most important lesson from the life and work of John Maynard Keynes may be 
that the macroeconomist should start from the important problems of the day. (…) 
There are some things that Keynes would not have us do. He would not have us try 
to deduce how the world works from a small set of doubtful ‘axioms’ about tastes and 
technologies. (Leijonhufvud, 2009 pp. 741-742) 
 
 True enough, Keynes, and most economists since the Middle Ages, started from the 
problems of the day. But Keynes was aware that his policy proposals were already popular in 
the economic literature of the 1930s (Laidler, 1999 p. 10) and that without a theoretical 
foundation his pleas for the alleviation of unemployment would not be essentially different 
from a soap-box speech. Reinforcing the methodological consensus since Adam Smith 
(Hollander, 1977), (Stigum, 1991 p. 4) Keynes aimed at the premises of orthodox economics: 
For if orthodox economics is at fault, the error is to be found not in the superstructure, 
which has been erected with great care for logical consistency, but in a lack of 
clearness and of generality in the premises. (Keynes, 1973 p. xxi) 
 
 True again, Keynes rejected the orthodox set of axioms; but not the axiomatic 
method. The General Theory is the attempt to reconstruct economic theory from entirely new 
premises and the lesson from this unfinished venture is that it is not self-evident how to 
replace a small set of doubtful axioms. It needs more than a start from the problems of the 
day. 
 
From the fact that something went wrong with neoclassical axiomatization (Hudson, 2010 p. 
54) it does not logically follow that: 
Economics can’t be a “Euclidean” science. It reduces it to a logical axiomatic system 
in applied mathematics, with little bearing on real economies. (…) It is better to admit 
there are “things we don’t know we don’t know” and that therefore the future is 
uncertain in ways we don’t know. (Pålsson Syll, 2010 pp. 43, 47) 
 
 Lack of knowledge had been a serious concern since Socrates; and Euclid was not 
much occupied with predicting the future. But all this did not inhibit the utilization of his 
method from 300 BC onwards. It not always met with success, to be sure. The crucial point is 
not axiomatization per se but the choice of axioms. As Clower put it: 
My opinion continues to be that axiomatics, like every other tool of science, is no 
better than its user, and not all users are skilled. (Clower, 1995 p. 308) 
 
 As things stand now neither neoclassical nor Keynesian economics possess a 
qualified axiomatic basis. The point at issue is the real-world content of axioms and a realistic 
understanding of what the axiomatic method can accomplish. 
 
 For a paradigmatic case let us briefly return to Euclid and the Pythagorean Theorem. 
With a known baseline and two known angles one can calculate the unknown and not directly 
measurable distance to the moon. In physics a theorem is used as a calculating device 
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1971 p. 332). The usefulness of theorems is beyond question. 
 
 The application of a theorem, however, implicitly introduces a new claim. The first 
claim is that the Pythagorean Theorem is true1, i.e. formally correct. By applying it to calculate 
the distance to the moon it is tacitly assumed that earth and moon are located in Euclidian 
space which is quite another claim that may or may not be true2. While true1 refers to the 
axioms, true2 refers to reality. Only when the properties of the space that is formally given with 
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the axioms happen to be those of real space will the calculation of the distance yield the 
correct result. By innocently applying the Pythagorean Theorem we therefore implicitly make 
the really strong claim that the Euclidean axioms capture reality. If this happens to be the 
case, and as far as we know it does in the earth’s vicinity to a satisfactory degree, then true1 
and true2 amalgamate. Under this condition a theorem can be applied as a calculating device 
that enables valid inferences from known facts to unknown facts. The process is cumulative. 
 
 From this follows that rationality, perfect foresight, or individualism cannot be 
declared as axioms (Kirman, 2009 p. 81). The axiomatic method is neither a device for the 
prediction of human behavior nor for the production of infallible truth. The 'garbage in, 
garbage out' rule applies and this conservation principle is the reason why the axiomatic 
method is indispensable. At the very least it helps to impede policy proposals that are logically 
defective. True1 is necessary but, of course, for an empirical science this is not sufficient. 
True2 is also required. The axiomatic method does not entail the promise of a free lunch. 
 
 J. S. Mill clearly enunciated the question that stands at the beginning of any and 
every scientific inquiry: 
What are the propositions which may reasonably be received without proof? That 
there must be some such propositions all are agreed, since there cannot be an 
infinite series of proof, a chain suspended from nothing. But to determine what these 
propositions are, is the opus magnum of the more recondite mental philosophy. (Mill, 
2006/1843 p. 746), original emphasis. 
 
 Axioms are no dogmata, neither are they arbitrary. The specifics of the subject matter 
determine the specifics of the tool. Methodology does not compel anybody to accept vacuous 
behavioral assumptions as axioms. Heterodox economists are free to 'scrap the lot’ (Joan 
Robinson quoted in (Harcourt, 2010 p. 50) be it neoclassical or Keynesian or, yes, heterodox. 
This, however, is only the preliminary part of the opus magnum. 
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